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Abstract
We present a necessary and suﬃcient condition on an agent’s utility function for a simple
mean preserving spread in an independent background risk to increase the agent’s risk aver-
sion (incremental risk vulnerability). Gollier and Pratt (1996) have shown that declining
and convex risk aversion as well as standard risk aversion are suﬃcient for risk vulnerability.
We show that these conditions are also suﬃcient for incremental risk vulnerability.
In addition, we present suﬃcient conditions for a restricted set of stochastic increases in an
independent background risk to increase risk aversion.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers:
D 52, D 81Incremental Risk Vulnerability 2
1 new bit for introduction
In this paper, we consider a particular set of increases in an independent background risk.
In reality all investors face some level of background risk, so a relevant question is how they
would react to an increase in such a risk. We look for conditions on utility functions such
that an agent becomes more averse to a market risk given an increase in background risk.
This question has been considered previously by Kimball (1993) and by Eeckhoudt, Gollier
and Schlesinger (1996). Kimball considers the set of ’patent increases’ in background risk1.
He shows that standard risk aversion is a suﬃcient condition for ’incremental risk vulner-
ability’ for this set of increases. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), on the other
hand, consider the larger sets of ﬁrst order and second order stochastic dominance increases
in background risk. They ﬁnd that the conditions on utility functions are quite restrictive
and exclude many commonly assumed utility functions.
In this paper, we follow Kimball’s general approach by looking at the eﬀect of particular
sets of increases in background risk. We begin with a set of non-stochastic mean-preserving
spread increases that we term ‘simple increases’. For this set, we derive a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for incremental risk vulnerability. We ﬁnd in this case, a condition on
utility which is weaker than standard risk aversion.
An interesting subset of our simple increases is the set of monotonic increases in background
risk. This set is interesting, ﬁrst, because it reﬂects the property that background risks in-
crease in scale. Second, this case generalizes naturally to the set of stochastic increases that
‘improve’ according to nth order stochastic dominance. Kimball (1993) has shown that, in
the case of stochastic increases that improve according to third-order stochastic dominance,
standard risk aversion is a suﬃcient condition for incremental risk vulnerability. Consider-
ing the case of n-th order improvements, we ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition for incremental risk
vulnerability, which is less restrictive than standard risk aversion.
2 Introduction
Many economic decisions are made in a context where some of the risks are tradable, while
others are not. These non-tradable or background risks are not controllable by the decision-
maker and yet inﬂuence the agent’s risk-taking behavior with respect to the tradable claims.
1Patent increases are those such that an agent who is more risk averse than another, always requires a
larger risk premium to bear the increased risk than the other. See Kimball (1993), p 603.Incremental Risk Vulnerability 3
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) and Meyer and Meyer (1998) demonstrate this for the de-
mand for insurance, Franke, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1998) for portfolio choice. A
central question, in this context, is whether an additive background risk makes the agent
more risk averse.
Gollier and Pratt (1996) answer this question by considering an agent who starts without
background risk and then faces an independent background risk. They introduce the concept
of risk vulnerability and show that risk vulnerability is equivalent to the notion that an
undesirable risk can never be made desirable by the presence of an independent, unfair
risk. Furthermore, the background risk makes the agent more risk averse. Hence, such a
background risk reduces the agent’s demand for a risky asset, given a choice between a risky
and a risk-free asset. Gollier and Pratt derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for risk
vulnerability. They show that a suﬃcient condition for risk vulnerability is either that the
absolute risk aversion of the agent is declining and convex or that the agent is standard risk
averse in the sense of Kimball (1993). In a recent paper Keenan and Snow (2003) relate
Gollier and Pratt’s condition of local risk vulnerability to compensated increases in risk,
introduced by Diamond and Stiglitz (1974). They show that the introduction of a small
fair background risk increases risk aversion of agents more, the higher is their index of local
risk vulnerability.
Usually, agents have to bear some background risk, but the level of this risk may change.
Therefore the relevant question is not so much whether the presence of background risk
makes the agent more risk averse, but whether an increase in this background risk makes
the agent more risk averse. Kimball (1993) analyzes patent increases in background risk.
He shows that such an increase raises the risk aversion of an agent if it raises the expected
marginal utility conditional on his tradable income and if the agent is standard risk averse.
Kimball argues that the background risk X is patently more risky than the background risk
x if X can be obtained from x by adding a random variable v such that the distribution of
v conditional on x improves for increasing x according to third-order stochastic dominance.
Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) consider this issue in the context of increases in
an independent background risk that exhibit second order stochastic dominance. Given this
broad set of increases in background risk they derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions,
which leave room only for a small set of utility functions. Finally, Eichner and Wagener
(2003) discuss the conditions on two-parameter, mean-variance preferences such that the
agent is variance vulnerable, i.e. an increase in the variance of an independent background
risk induces the agent to take less tradable risk.
Intuitively, there must be an inverse relation between the set of admissible increases in
background risk considered and the set of utility functions that exhibit the characteristic of
increased risk aversion. Therefore, in this article we consider a smaller, but plausible set ofIncremental Risk Vulnerability 4
increases in background risk, the beneﬁt being obtaining a broader set of utility functions
that have the desired attribute.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) deﬁne a mean preserving spread of an existing risk as a shift
in the probability mass from the center to the tails of the distribution. As pointed out by
Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), this is equivalent to a second degree stochastic
dominance shift, provided the mean is ﬁxed. To this deﬁnition we add the restriction
that the increase in background risk raises the non-tradable income in some states above
a threshold level and lowers it in some states below the threshold. We call this increase a
simple mean preserving spread.
Let y be the independent background risk with E(y) = 0, then a simple mean preserving
spread is a deterministic change in y,∆ ( y), such that ∆(y) ≤ [=] [≥ ] 0 for y<[=] [> ] y0
for a given a threshold level y0, and E[∆(y)] = 0. In this case, note that the rank order of
outcomes below y0 may change, as well as the rank order of outcomes above y0.
We introduce the concept of incremental risk vulnerability. An agent is incremental risk
vulnerable if a simple mean preserving spread in background risk makes the agent more
risk averse. In section 2 we derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for incremental
risk vulnerability. It turns out that the suﬃcient conditions for risk vulnerability given by
Gollier and Pratt are also suﬃcient for incremental risk vulnerability. However, declining
risk aversion is not required. All utility functions with a negative third and a negative
fourth derivative are also incremental risk vulnerable.
In section 3, we further consider a restricted set of stochastic increases in background risk
and derive suﬃcient conditions for risk aversion to increase. These conditions are illustrated
by examples.
3 Characterization of Incremental Risk Vulnerability
In this section we present a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the utility function to
exhibit incremental risk vulnerability. The agent’s income, W, is composed of the tradable
income w and the non-tradable income y, i.e. W = w + y. The non-tradable income
represents an additive background risk. y is assumed to be distributed independently of w
and to have a zero mean. Moreover, y is assumed to be bounded from below and above,
i.e. y ∈ (y
¯
, ¯ y). Finally, W = w + y ∈ (W
¯
, ¯ W) is assumed. Let (Ω,F,P) be the probability
space on which the random variables are deﬁned.Incremental Risk Vulnerability 5
Deﬁnition 1 (A Simple Mean Preserving Spread in Background Risk)
Let y be a background risk with E(y)=0 . Then a simple mean preserving spread in the
background risk changes y to y + s∆(y), with E(∆(y)) = 0, where ∆(y) ≤ [=][ ≥ ] 0 for
y<[=][ > ] y0 ,and s ≥ 0 denotes the scale of the increase.
The agent’s utility function is u(W). We assume that the utility function is state-independent,
strictly increasing, strictly concave, and four times diﬀerentiable on W ∈ (W
¯
, ¯ W). We as-
sume that there exist integrable functions on ω ∈ Ω, u0 and u1 such that
u0(ω) ≤ u(W) ≤ u1(ω)
We also assume that similar conditions hold for the derivatives u0(W),u 00(W) and u000(W).
The agent’s expected utility, conditional on w, is given by the derived utility function, as
deﬁned by Kihlstrom et al. (1981) and Nachman (1982):
ν(w)=Ey[u(W)] ≡ E[u(w + y)|w] (1)
where Ey indicates an expectation taken over diﬀerent outcomes of y. Thus, the agent with
background risk and a von Neumann-Morgenstern concave utility function u(W) acts like an
individual without background risk and a concave utility function ν(w). The coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion is deﬁned as r(W)=−u00(W)/u0(W) and the coeﬃcient of absolute
prudence as p(W)=−u000(W)/u00(W). The absolute risk aversion of the agents derived
utility function is deﬁned as the negative of the ratio of the second derivative to the ﬁrst
derivative of the derived utility function with respect to w, i.e.,
ˆ r(w)=−
ν00(w)
ν0(w)
= −
Ey[u00(W)]
Ey[u0(W)]
(2)
It is worth noting that, in the absence of background risk, ˆ r(w) is equal to r(w), the
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion of the original utility function.
We are now in a position to deﬁne incremental risk vulnerability.
Deﬁnition 2 (Incremental Risk Vulnerability)
An agent is incremental risk vulnerable if a simple mean preserving spread in background
risk increases the agent’s derived risk aversion for all w.
This deﬁnition also includes the case in which the agent initially has no background risk.
This case is analyzed by Gollier and Pratt (1996). Hence incremental risk vulnerability
implies risk vulnerability subject to E[∆(y)] = E[y] = 0. Gollier and Pratt allow also forIncremental Risk Vulnerability 6
a non-random negative y which then necessitates declining risk aversion. Since we only
consider fair background risks, declining risk aversion is not implied by incremental risk
vulnerability.
The main result of this paper is the following proposition which presents a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for a marginal simple mean preserving spread in background risk to
raise derived risk aversion, i.e. ∂ˆ r(w)/∂s > 0.
Proposition 1 (Derived Risk Aversion and Simple Mean Preserving Spreads in Back-
ground Risk)
If u0(W) > 0 and u00(W) < 0, then for any simple mean preserving spread in background
risk,
∂ˆ r(w)/∂s > [=][<]0 , ∀(w,y,s) ⇐⇒
u000(W2) − u000(W1) < [=][>] − r(W)[u00(W2) − u00(W1)],
∀ (W,W1,W 2),W
¯
<W 1 ≤ W ≤ W2 < ¯ W,W2 − W1 < ¯ y − y
¯
.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 allows us to analyze the eﬀect of any simple mean preserving spread in an
independent background risk. Since a ﬁnite increase in background risk is the sum of
marginal increases, the suﬃciency condition in Proposition 1 also holds for ﬁnite increases
in background risk.
In order to interpret the necessary and suﬃcient condition under which a simple mean
preserving spread in a background risk will raise the risk aversion of the derived utility
function, ﬁrst consider the special case in which background risk changes from zero to a
small positive level. This is the case analyzed previously by Gollier and Pratt (1996) and
by Keenan and Snow (2003). In this case, we have
Corollary 1 Starting with no background risk, for any marginal increase in background
risk,
ˆ r(w) > [=][<] r(w) if and only if
∂θ
∂W
< [=][>]0 , ∀ W
where θ(W) ≡ u000(W)/u0(W).Incremental Risk Vulnerability 7
Proof: Let W2 − W1 → dW. In this case, u000(W2) − u000(W1) → u0000(W)dW. Similarly
u00(W2) − u00(W1) → u000(W)dW.
Hence, the condition in the Proposition yields, in this case, u0000(W) < [=][>] −r(W)u000(W).
This is equivalent to ∂θ/∂W < [=][>]0 , ∀ W 2
In Corollary 1, θ(W)=u000(W)/u0(W)i sacombined prudence/risk aversion measure. This
measure is deﬁned by the product of the coeﬃcient of absolute prudence and the coeﬃcient
of absolute risk aversion. The corollary says that for a small background risk derived risk
aversion exceeds [is equal to] [is smaller than] risk aversion if and only if θ(W) decreases
[stays constant] [increases] with W. Hence, it is signiﬁcant that neither decreasing prudence
nor decreasing absolute risk aversion is necessary for derived risk aversion to exceed risk
aversion. However, the combination of these conditions is suﬃcient for the result to hold,
since the requirement is that the product of the two must be decreasing. The condition
in corollary 1 is thus weaker than standard risk aversion, which is characterized by both
absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence being positive and decreasing. Note that
the condition in this case is the same as the ’local risk vulnerability’ condition derived by
Gollier and Pratt (1996). Local risk vulnerability is r00 > 2rr0, which is equivalent to θ0 < 0.
Keenan and Snow (2003) deﬁne −θ0 as the local risk vulnerability index. They show for a
small background risk that the diﬀerence between derived risk aversion and risk aversion
increases in this index.
Since an interior maximum of r(w) implies r0(w) = 0 and r00(w) < 0, it rules out local risk
vulnerability. Therefore, we have
Corollary 2 Risk vulnerability and incremental risk vulnerability rule out all utility func-
tions with an interior maximum of absolute risk aversion.
An alternative way to interpret Corollary 1 and Proposition 1 is to assume u000 > 0. In
this case, Corollary 1 states that a marginal increase in background risk, starting with
no background risk, makes the agent more risk averse if and only if temperance t(W)=
−u0000(W)/u000(W) exceeds risk aversion r(W) everywhere. Proposition 1 states that a simple
mean preserving spread in background risk makes an agent more risk averse if and only if
−[u000(W2) − u000(W1)]/[u00(W2) − u00(W1)] >r (W), for W1 ≤ W ≤ W2. The left hand side
of this inequality can be interpreted as an average temperance over the range [W1,W 2]. In
their analysis of second order stochastic dominance shifts in background risk, Eeckoudt,
Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) ﬁnd the much stronger condition t(W) ≥ r(W0),∀(W,W 0).
We now apply Proposition 1 to show that standard risk aversion is suﬃcient for incremental
risk vulnerability.Incremental Risk Vulnerability 8
Corollary 3 Standard risk aversion is a suﬃcient condition for derived risk aversion to
increase with a simple mean preserving spread in background risk.
Proof: Standard risk aversion requires both positive, decreasing absolute risk aversion and
positive, decreasing absolute prudence. Further, r0(W) < 0 ⇒ p(W) >r (W) and hence
u000(W) > 0. It follows that the condition in the Proposition for an increase in the derived
risk aversion can be written as 2
u000(W2) − u000(W1)
u00(W2) − u00(W1)
< −r(W1)
or, alternatively,
p(W1)
￿
1 −
u000(W2)
u000(W1)
￿
/
￿
1 −
u00(W2)
u00(W1)
￿
>r (W1)
Since p(W1) >r (W1), a suﬃcient condition is that the ratio of the square brackets exceeds
1. This, in turn, follows from decreasing absolute prudence, p0(W) < 0. Hence, standard
risk aversion is a suﬃcient condition 2
Gollier and Pratt (1996) showed not only that standard risk aversion is suﬃcient for risk
vulnerability, but so also is declining and convex absolute risk aversion r(w). The next
corollary shows that the latter condition is also suﬃcient for incremental risk vulnerability.
Corollary 4 Declining and convex absolute risk aversion is a suﬃcient condition for de-
rived risk aversion to increase with a simple mean preserving spread in background risk.
Proof: From
ˆ r(w)=Ey
"
u0(W)
Ey[u0(W)]
r(W)
#
,
∂ˆ r(w)/∂s = Ey
"
u0(W)
Ey[u0(W)]
r0(W)∆(y)
#
+ Ey
"
r(W)
∂
∂y
"
u0(W)
Ey[u0(W)]
#
∆(y)
#
(3)
As shown in the appendix, it suﬃces to consider a three-point distribution of background
risk (y1,y 0,y 2) with y1 < 0,y 2 > 0,y 1 <y 0 <y 2 and ∆(y0)=0 ,∆(y1) < 0,∆(y2) > 0.
The ﬁrst term in equation (3) is positive whenever r is declining and convex. This follows
since E(∆(y)) = 0 and ∆(y2) > ∆(y1) implies that E[r0(W)∆(y)] ≥ 0. Since u0(W)i s
2Note that whenever r
0(W) has the same sign for all W, the three-state condition in the Proposition (i.e.
the condition on W, W1, and W2) can be replaced by a two-state condition (a condition on W1 and W2).Incremental Risk Vulnerability 9
declining, it follows that the ﬁrst term in (3) is positive. Now consider the second term:
∂[u0(W)/Ey[u0(W)]]/∂y ∆(y) is positive for y1 and negative for y2 and has zero expectation.
Therefore a declining r implies that the second term is positive. Hence a suﬃcient condition
for ∂ˆ r(w)/∂s > 0 is a declining and convex r 2
Although corollaries 3 and 4 use the property of declining risk aversion, this property is
clearly not required for incremental risk vulnerability, as already noted by Gollier and Pratt.
Corollary 5 : For every utility function with u000(W) < 0 and u0000(W) ≤ 0 a simple mean
preserving spread in background risk raises derived risk aversion.
Proof: u0000(W) ≤ 0 implies that the left hand side of the condition in Proposition 1 is non-
positive. u000(W) < 0 implies that the right hand side is positive 2
A utility function with u000(W) < 0 exhibits negative prudence and increasing risk aversion.
Yet this utility function has the property of incremental risk vulnerability if the fourth
derivative is also negative. In terms of equation (3), the second term is now negative, but
it is overcompensated by a strongly positive ﬁrst term due to strong convexity of r.
An example of a utility function with the properties stated in corollary 5 is the HARA-
function
u(W)=
1 − γ
γ
￿
A +
W
1 − γ
￿γ
,where γ ∈ (1,2),W <A(γ − 1) .
4 Stochastic Increases in Background Risk and Risk Aver-
sion
A simple mean preserving spread in background risk is a deterministic change relating ∆(y)
to y. A natural generalization is to consider a stochastic change e such that y is replaced
by (y + e) with e being distributed independently of w, but perhaps dependently on y.
In the case of dependence, the distribution of e is assumed to improve with increasing y
according to second-order stochastic dominance, i.e. the distribution of e conditional on y
second-order stochastically dominates the distribution conditional on a smaller y. It will be
assumed throughout that this improvement can be captured by the diﬀerential ∂e/∂y. This
diﬀerential is zero in the case of independence. We, ﬁrst, derive suﬃcient conditions on e
and on absolute risk aversion to ensure an increase in derived risk aversion and, second,
illustrate these conditions.Incremental Risk Vulnerability 10
We analyse the agent’s derived risk aversion ˆ r(w) in the presence of only the y-risk and the
derived risk aversion ˆ ˆ r(w) in the presence of the (y + e)-risk. For this purpose we deﬁne
re(w + y) as the derived risk aversion over the e-risk, given the income (w + y).
re(w + y) ≡
Ee[−u00(w + y + e)]
Ee[u0(w + y + e)]
; ∀(w + y).
Proposition 2 provides suﬃcient conditions for the e-risk to raise the agent’s risk aversion.
Proposition 2 Let e be a random variable which is distributed independently of w, but per-
haps dependently on y. In case of dependence, the distribution of e improves with increasing
y according to second-order stochastic dominance.
Then
ˆ ˆ r(w) ≥ ˆ r(w), ∀ w,
if
re(w + y) ≥ r(w + y), ∀ (w + y), (4)
and
dre(w + y)/dy ≤ 0, ∀ (w,y). (5)
This proposition is proved in Appendix 2. Condition (4) requires the risk aversion of an
agent with income w + y to be higher in the presence of the background risk, e. Condition
(4) rules out a subset of the second-order stochastic dominance increases in background
risk as analysed by Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996). It also rules out a simple
mean preserving spread since y2 >y 1 does not imply y2 +∆ ( y2) >y 1 +∆ ( y1). Condition
(5) requires the derived risk aversion re(w + y) to decline. For a small e-risk, condition
(5) implies declining risk aversion of u. Hence condition (5) requires this property to be
preserved under the e-risk.
Both conditions are quite natural given a utility function with declining risk aversion. The
following corollaries illustrate Proposition 2.
Corollary 6 The increase in background risk from y to (y+e) raises the derived risk aver-
sion if e is a random variable, distributed independently of y, with nonpositive expectation
and if the agent is risk vulnerable.Incremental Risk Vulnerability 11
Proof: Risk vulnerability and nonpositive expectation of e imply condition (4). Since e is
independent of y and declining risk aversion is preserved under background risk, condition
(5) holds 2
Next, consider the case in which the distribution of e depends on y such that the distribution
of e improves with increasing y according to a second-order stochastic dominance shift.
Corollary 7 Assume r0 < 0, r00 > 0 and E(e|y) ≤ 0 ∀y. Moreover, the distribution of e
may improve with increasing y according to second-order stochastic dominance. Then the
increase in background risk replacing y by (y + e) raises the derived risk aversion.
Proof: From Gollier and Pratt(1996), r0 < 0, r00 > 0 and E(e|y) ≤ 0 imply risk vulnerability
and, hence, condition (4). In Appendix 2 condition (5) is shown to hold, too 2
5 Conclusion
This paper considers the eﬀect on derived risk aversion of increases in background risk. We
ﬁrst take the case of deterministic increases which are simple mean preserving spreads. We
present a necessary and suﬃcient condition for such an increase to raise the derived risk
aversion of an agent. Standard risk aversion and declining, convex risk aversion are shown
to be suﬃcient conditions.
We then analyse the eﬀect of stochastic increases in background risk. If such an increase
is independent of the existing background risk and has a non-positive expectation, it raises
derived risk aversion if the agent is risk vulnerable. If the distribution of the increase
improves with increasing realisations of the existing background risk according to second-
order stochastic dominance and the conditional expectation of the increase is non-positive,
then the derived risk aversion of an agent with declining, convex risk aversion increases.Incremental Risk Vulnerability 12
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
From the deﬁnition of ˆ r(w),
ˆ r(w)=
Ey[−u00(W)]
Ey[u0(W)]
(6)
we have the following condition. For any distribution of y and for any s ≥ 0,
∂ˆ r(w)/∂s > [=][<]0 ⇐⇒ f(w,y,s) > [=][<]0 , (7)
where f(w,y,s) is deﬁned as
f(w,y,s) ≡ Ey
￿
∆(y)
￿
−u000(W) − u00(W)ˆ r(w)
￿￿
. (8)
Necessity
We now show that
f(w,y,s) > [=][<]0 = ⇒
u000(W2) − u000(W1) < [=][>] −r(W)
￿
u00(W2) − u00(W1)
￿
,∀ W1 ≤ W ≤ W2
Consider a background risk with three possible outcomes, y0, y1, and y2, such that
y1 <y 0 <y 2 and ∆(y1) < ∆(y0)=0< ∆(y2). Deﬁne
Wi = w + yi + s∆(yi),i =0 ,1,2,
and let qi denote the probability of the outcome yi. For the special case of such a risk,
equation (8) can be written as
f(w,y,s)=q1|∆(y1)|
￿
−u000(W2)+u000(W1) − [u00(W2) − u00(W1)]ˆ r(w)
￿
(9)
since
E[∆(y)] =
2 X
i=0
qi∆(yi)=0Incremental Risk Vulnerability 13
so that
q1|∆(y1)| = q2∆(y2)
Now ˆ r(w) can be rewritten from (6) as
ˆ r(w)=Ey
(
u0(W)
Ey[u0(W)]
−u00(W)
u0(W)
)
= Ey
(
u0(W)
Ey[u0(W)]
r(W)
)
(10)
Hence, ˆ r(w) is the expected value of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, using the
risk-neutral probabilities given by the respective probabilities multiplied by the ratio of
the marginal utility to the expected marginal utility. Thus, ˆ r(w) is a convex combination
of the coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion at the diﬀerent values of y. For the three-
point distribution being considered, ˆ r(w) is a convex combination of r(W0), r(W1), and
r(W2). Suppose that y0 = 0. Then q0 → 1 is feasible. Hence, as q0 → 1, ˆ r(w) → r(W0).
Therefore, in condition (9) we replace ˆ r(w)b yr(W0). Since W0 can take any value in
the range [W1,W 2], f(w,y,s) must have the required sign for every value of r(W0), where
W1 ≤ W0 ≤ W2. Thus, since q1|∆(y1)| > 0, the condition as stated in Proposition 1 must
hold. As y ∈ (y
¯
, ¯ y),W 2 − W1 < ¯ y − y
¯
.
Suﬃciency
To establish suﬃciency we use a method similar to that used by Pratt and Zeckhauser
(1987) and Gollier and Pratt (1996).
a) We ﬁrst show
u000(W2) − u000(W1) < −r(W)
￿
u00(W2) − u00(W1)
￿
, ∀ W1 ≤ W ≤ W2
=⇒ f(w,y,s) > 0, ∀ (w,y,s)
We need to show that f(w,y,s) > 0, for all non-degenerate probability distributions of y.
Hence, we need to prove that the minimum value of f(w,y,s) over all possible probability
distributions {qi}, with E(∆(y)) = 0, must be positive. In a manner similar to Gollier
and Pratt (1996), this can be formulated as a mathematical programming problem, where
f(w,y,s) is minimized, subject to the constraints that all qi are non-negative and sumIncremental Risk Vulnerability 14
to one, and E(∆(y)) = 0. Equivalently, this can be reformulated as a parametric linear
program where the non-linearity is eliminated by writing ¯ r as a parameter
min
{qi}
f(w,y,s)=
X
i
qi
￿
∆(yi)
￿
−u000(Wi) − u00(Wi)¯ r
￿￿
(11)
s.t. X
i
qi∆(yi) = 0 (12)
X
i
qi =1 , (13)
the deﬁnitional constraint for the parameter ¯ r
¯ r
X
i
qiu0(Wi)=−
X
i
qiu00(Wi) (14)
and the non-negativity constraints
qi ≥ 0, ∀i. (15)
Consider the optimal solution. Since this optimization problem has three constraints, there
are three variables in the basis. Number these as i =1 ,2,a, with ∆(y1) < 0 < ∆(y2)
and y1 + s∆(y1) <y 2 + s∆(y2). The associated probabilities are q1,q 2,q a, such that
q1∆(y1)+qa∆(ya)+q2∆(y2)=0 . There are two possibilities with respect to the state
a.
Either:
a = 0. Then ∆(ya)=∆ ( y0) = 0. Hence, we immediately obtain equation (16).
or:
a 6= 0. In this case we drop the constraint on q0 ≥ 0 (with all the other qis staying
non-negative). Hence the probability associated with y0 can be negative. Dropping this
constraint will lead to a condition that is too demanding. However, since we are searching
for a suﬃcient condition, this is ﬁne. In the original optimisation, all the non-basis variables
had nonnegative coeﬃcients in the objective function in the ﬁnal simplex tableau. Allowing
q0 < 0 must result therefore in q0 replacing either q1, q2 or qa in the optimal basis. Also,
the new f-value is either lower or the same as before.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that q0 replaces qa in the optimal basis. Then the new basis variables
are q1, q2 and q0. Since ∆(y0) = 0, we can write the objective function (11) asIncremental Risk Vulnerability 15
f∗(w,y,s)=q1∆(y1)
￿
−u000(W1) − u00(W1)¯ r
￿
+ q2∆(y2)
￿
−u000(W2) − u00(W2)¯ r
￿
(16)
Since q1∆(y1)+q2∆(y2) = 0, it follows that (14) can be rewritten as
f∗(w,y,s)=q1∆(y1)
￿
(−u000(W1) − u00(W1)¯ r) − (−u000(W2) − u00(W2)¯ r)
￿
(17)
Hence
u000(W2) − u000(W1) < −¯ r
￿
u00(W2) − u00(W1)
￿
(18)
is a suﬃcient condition for f∗ > 0, given ¯ r.
As shown in equation (10), ¯ r is a convex combination of r(Wa), r(W1) and r(W2) with
W1 <W a <W 2, hence ¯ r ∈{ r(W)|W ∈ [W1,W 2]}. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for (18) is
that
u000(W2) − u000(W1) < −r(W)
￿
u00(W2) − u00(W1)
￿
(19)
for all {W1 ≤ W ≤ W2} as given by the condition of Proposition 1.
Alternatively, suppose that q0 replaces either q1 or q2 in the optimal basis. In this case the
above argument remains the same with qa instead of either q1 or q2, in equation (16).
b) By an analogous argument, it can be shown that ∂ˆ r(w)/∂s < [=] 0 is equivalent to
u000(W2) − u000(W1) > [=] − r(W)[u00(W2) − u00(W1)] ∀{ W1 ≤ W ≤ W2} 2
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 2
We need to show that conditions (4) and (5) are suﬃcient for ˆ ˆ r(w)−ˆ r(w) ≥ 0. Ev[·] denotes
expectations over v. From the deﬁnition of the twice derived risk aversion, ˆ ˆ r,
ˆ ˆ r(w)=Ey+e
"
u0(w + y + e)
Ey+eu0(w + y + e)
r(w + y + e)
#
= Ey
"
Eeu0(w + y + e)
Ey+eu0(w + y + e)
Ee
￿
u0(w + y + e)
Eeu0(w + y + e)
r(w + y + e)
￿#Incremental Risk Vulnerability 16
= Ey
"
Eeu0(w + y + e)
Ey+eu0(w + y + e)
re(w + y)
#
,
where re(w + y) is as deﬁned on page 9. Hence
ˆ ˆ r(w) − ˆ r(w)=Ey
" 
Eeu0(w + y + e)
Ey+eu0(w + y + e)
−
u0(w + y)
Eyu0(w + y)
!
re(w + y)
#
+ Ey
"
u0(w + y)
Eyu0(w + y)
(re(w + y) − r(w + y))
#
Condition (4) implies that the second term is positive or zero. The ﬁrst term is similar
to a covariance term since the term in ( ) has zero expectation. Hence the ﬁrst term is
nonnegative if the term in ( ) is single crossing downwards and re(w + y) is declining in y.
The latter is implied by condition (5). Therefore, to complete the proof we have to establish
the single crossing downward property. For notational simplicity, let Z(w + y) denote the
term in ( ),
Z(w + y)=
Eeu0(w + y + e)
a
−
u0(w + y)
b
,
with a and b being appropriately deﬁned constants.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to y yields
Z0(w + y)=
Eeu00(w + y + e)(1 + ∂e
∂y)
a
−
u00(w + y)
b
= −
Eeu0(w + y + e)
a
re(w + y)+
u0(w + y)
b
r(w + y)+
Eeu00(w + y + e)∂e
∂y
a
.
For Z = 0 it follows that sgnZ0(w + y)=sgn[r(w + y) − re(w + y)+[ Eeu0(w + y +
e)]−1Eeu00(w+y+e)(∂e/∂y)]. Hence condition (4) implies Z0(w+y) ≤ 0 at a crossing point
if e is distributed independently of y, i.e. ∂e/∂y ≡ 0. Then only one crossing point exists,
therefore Z(w +y) is downward sloping. If the distribution of e improves with increasing y
according to second-order stochastic dominance, then Eeu00(w+y+e)(de/dy) < 0i fu000 > 0.
u000 > 0 follows from condition (5) because dre(w + y)/dy ≤ 0 holds for a small risk only if
r0 < 0. Hence, at a crossing point, Z0(w + y) ≤ 0. 2Incremental Risk Vulnerability 17
Proof of Corollary 7
We need to show that condition (5) holds if the distribution of e improves with increasing
y according to second-order stochastic dominance. Since
re(w + y)=Ee
￿
u0(w + y + e)
Eeu0(w + y + e)
r(w + y + e)
￿
,
dre(w + y)
dy
= Ee
￿
u0(w + y + e)
Eeu0(w + y + e)
dr(w + y + e)
dy
￿
+ Ee
￿
d
dy
￿
u0(w + y + e)
Eeu0(w + y + e)
￿
r(w + y + e)
￿
.
The ﬁrst term is a ”risk-adjusted” expectation of dr(w+y+e)/dy.I fe were distributed inde-
pendently of y, then r0 < 0 would imply a negative expectation. This is reinforced for r0 < 0
and r00 > 0 if the distribution of e improves according to second-order stochastic dominance.
Now consider the second term. Using the proof technique of Gollier and Pratt (1996,
p. 1122) it follows that this term is negative if it is for every binomial distribution of e.
Suppose that e is distributed independently of y. Then u00 < 0 and u000 > 0 imply that
u0(w +y+e)/Eeu0(w+y+e) declines [increases] in y for the lower [higher] realization of e.
Hence r0 < 0 implies that the second term is negative. This is reinforced if the distribution of
e improves according to second-order stochastic dominance. Hence dre(w+y)/d(w+y) ≤ 0
2Incremental Risk Vulnerability 18
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